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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1# Did the Public Service Commission abuse its 
discretion in interpreting a tariff to permit Mountain Bell 
to transfer a partnership debt for past telephone service to 
the current business service account of a general partner? 
2. Did Mountain Bell violate any constitutional, 
statutory or common law rights of McCune by transferring the 
partnership debt to his individual proprietor account? 
DETERMINATIVE REGULATIONS 
The Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company 
Exchange and Network Services Tariff, Section A2.2.3.2(3). 
A. As constituted from December 30, 1982 to March 4, 
1985: 
In the event a customer is indebted to the Company for 
charges and services previously rendered in Utah, or for 
services under one or more numbers at the same location, 
and the customer does not pay the charges or satisfy 
such indebtedness, the Company may charge and bill such 
indebtedness for a residence account against the same 
customer's residence service or a business account 
against the customer's business service. 
B. As constituted from March 4, 1985 to present: 
In the event a customer is indebted to the Company for 
charges and services rendered at a prior time, of any 
nature, or for service at more than one number or loca-
tion, and the customer does not pay the charges or 
satisfy such indebtedness, the Company may charge and 
bill such indebtedness against the account of the cus-
tomer's present service or to the account of either ser-
vice in the case where more than one number or location 
is being served. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Appellants filed a complaint in the Public Service 
Commission seeking an injunction prohibiting Mountain Bell 
from disconnecting George McCune1s sole proprietor account 
for business telephone service, or any other accounts of the 
individual appellants, for non payment of a bill for tele-
phone service rendered to a dissolved partnership, McCune & 
McCune, of which George McCune was a general partner (R. 1-
12). Appellants also sought a declaration that Mountain 
Bell's actions in transferring the partnership account to 
the service accounts of the individual partners was uncon-
stitutional and unlawful, and requested the Commission to 
invalidate and replace regulations permitting such action. 
Following an evidentiary hearing, the Administrative Law 
Judge issued a Report and Order dismissing the Complaint 
with prejudice, holding that the complaints of all appel-
lants except George McCune were moot, and that George 
McCune's complaint was without merit (R. 197-204). The Com-
mission approved the Report and Order, whereupon Appellants 
filed a Petition for Review or Rehearing (R. 208-227), which 
was denied (R. 228-229). This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The Commission's Findings of Fact, as set forth in its 
Report and Order (attached hereto in the Addendum), may be 
summarized as follows: 
Mountain Bell provided service to McCune & McCune, a law 
partnership, until sometime in 1983 (R. 2, 90). The 
partnership was dissolved and the service was disconnected, 
leaving an undisputed balance of $317.29 (R. 91). In June, 
1984, with the account still unpaid, Mountain Bell rebilled 
the balance to the residence service account of James 
McCune, one of the general partners (R. 198). When he 
failed to pay the account in full, following a normal bill-
ing cycle, Mountain Bell disconnected his residence service 
(R. 198). After receiving and investigating a complaint 
about the disconnection, Mountain Bell discovered that its 
then existing tariff, which had recently been filed as part 
of a comprehensive reorganization of the general exchange 
tariff (R. 181-83), did not explicitly permit cross-billing 
from a business to a residence account, and therefore re-
stored James McCune's residence service (R. 198). 
Because the tariff did permit cross-billing between 
business accounts, Mountain Bell then transferred the 
partnership bill to an account for business service for 
George McCune, the other general partner (R. 198-99). 
Facing the prospect of disconnection of his individual busi-
ness service, George McCune filed a lawsuit in district 
court to enjoin the disconnection, and to recover damages 
(R. 250). Upon stipulation, that action was stayed to per-
mit him to file a complaint in the Public Service Commis-
sion , to determine the validity and applicability of the 
tariff provision under which Mountain Bell was proceeding. 
At all times material to the above described incidents, 
Mountain Bell's General Exchange Tariff, on file with the 
Commission, contained provisions relating to the transfer of 
an outstanding indebtedness to another account of a customer 
(R. 200) Those provisions and their effective dates are set 
forth below: 
A. Prior to December 30, 1982: 
In the event a customer is indebted to the Telephone 
Company for charges and services rendered at a prior 
time, of any nature, or for service at more than one 
number or location, and the customer does not pay the 
charges or satisfy such indebtedness, the Telephone Com-
pany may charge and bill such indebtedness against the 
account of the customer's present service or to the ac-
count of either service in the case where more than one 
number or location is being served. 
(Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph - Utah General 
Exchange Tariff Section 20(L)(4)). 
B. December 30, 1982: 
In the event a customer is indebted to the Company for 
charges and services previously rendered in Utah, or for 
services under one or more numbers at the same location, 
and the customer does not pay the charges or satisfy 
such indebtedness, the Company may charge and bill such 
indebtedness for a residence account against the same 
customer's residence service or a business account 
against the customer's business service. 
(Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph - Utah Exchange and 
Network Services Tariff A2.2.3.2(3)). 
This tariff provision was part of a comprehensive revi-
sion of basic exchange tariffs occuring in all seven states 
in which Mountain Bell does business (designated the nABCw 
tariff). The change was the result of an effort to simplify 
the numbering of the tariffs, among other things. It was 
not intended to change the wording of this provision. The 
provision was inadvertently changed from the previous tariff 
provision, and the change did not come to Mountain Bell's 
attention until Appellants complained about the disconnec-
tion of James McCune's residence service (R. 112). That 
disconnection occurred under the assumption that the pre-
vious provision had not been changed in the process of 
filing the ABC tariff (R. 112). As a result. Mountain Bell 
restored James McCune's residence service (R. 198) and then 
took action to reinstate the original provision, which was 
accomplished effective March 4, 1985, as follows: 
C. March 4, 1985: 
In the event a customer is indebted to the Company for 
charges and services rendered at a prior time, of any 
nature, or for service at more than one number or loca-
tion, and the customer does not pay the charges or 
satisfy such indebtedness, the Company may charge and 
bill such indebtedness against the account of the cus-
tomer's present service or to the account of either ser-
vice in the case where more than one number or location 
is being served. 
(Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company - Utah Ex-
change and Network Services Tariff Section A2.2.3.2(3)). 
McCune's Complaint in the Public Service Commission was 
filed on March 7, 1985 (R. 258). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The tariff in question provided that when a customer is 
indebted to Mountain Bell for prior servicef Mountain Bell 
may transfer the debt to the customer's account for present 
service. As a general partner, George McCune is jointly 
liable and hence indebted to Mountain Bell for the partner-
ship's debt. Thusf the tariff permits the partnership's 
debt to be transferred to McCune*s individual account for 
business service. 
The Public Service Commission's interpretation of the 
tariff to allow cross-billing of a dissolved partnership's 
debt to the account of one of the partners was within its 
authority, was reasonable, and was appropriate under the 
facts of this case. This Court should accord considerable 
deference to the Commission's decision on this question in-
volving the application of law (the tariff) to specific 
facts. The Commission did not act with bias, prejudice or 
passion. 
The transfer of the partnership's debt to McCune's indi-
vidual account did not violate his constitutional rights. 
Due process does not apply because no state action was in-
volved. With respect to equal protection, there is no 
evidence that he was treated differently from others simi-
larly situated. McCune's statutory rights were not violated 
because the tariff in question, as interpreted by the Public 
Service Commission, is just and reasonable, both on its face 
and as applied. McCune's common law rights were not vio-
lated, because Mountain Bell followed the tariff procedure. 
Josephson v. Mountain Bell, 576 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978), is 
distinguishable on its facts, and in any event should be 
overruled. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRE-
TION IN INTERPRETING THE TARIFF TO PERMIT MOUNTAIN BELL 
TO TRANSFER A PARTNERSHIP DEBT FOR TELEPHONE SERVICE TO 
THE BUSINESS ACCOUNT OF A GENERAL PARTNER. 
The central issue of this case is whether Mountain Bell 
was entitled to transfer a delinquent account for telephone 
service rendered to a partnership, since dissolved, to a 
current account for business service being rendered to one 
of the partners, under the following tariff provision: 
In the event a customer is indebted to the Company for 
charges and services previously rendered in Utah, or for 
services under one or more numbers at the same location, 
and the customer does not pay the charges or satisfy 
such indebtedness, the Company may charge and bill such 
indebtedness for a residence account against the same 
customer's residence service or a business account 
against the customer's business service. 
(Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph - Utah General 
Exchange Tariff A2.2.3.2(3)). 
The Public Service Commission determined that Mountain 
Bell's action was authorized by the tariff and was 
reasonable under the circumstances (R. 197-203). The order 
dismissing McCune's complaint necessarily implied the Public 
Service Commission's conclusion that the tariff is just and 
reasonable, both on its face and as applied (R. 203). 
A. The Public Service Commission has the power to 
interpret a tariff. 
The Public Service Commission has broad power to 
regulate the utility business of public utilities. Utah 
Code Ann. § 54-4-1 provides: 
General jurisdiction. The commission is hereby vested 
with power and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate 
every public utility in this state, and to supervise all 
of the business of every such public utility in this 
state, and to do all things, whether herein specifically 
designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary 
or convenient in the exercise of such power and juris-
diction . . . . 
See White River Shale Oil Corp. v. Public Service 
Commission, 700 P.2d 1088, 1093 (Utah 1985). 
Such power includes the power to approve, suspend or 
modify the schedules and regulations filed by a utility. 
E.g. Utah Code Ann. §§ 54-3-7, 54-3-8, 54-3-23, 54-4-2, 54-
4-7, 54-7-13. This extensive regulatory authority neces-
sarily implies the Commission's power to interpret or con-
strue a utility's regulations with respect to the facts of a 
particular case, and to determine the rights and obligations 
between utilities and consumers. See Mountain Bell v. 
Atkin, Wright & Miles, 681 P.2d 1258 (Utah 1984)]? North Salt 
Lake v. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation, Co., 118 Utah 600, 
223 P.2d 577 (1950). Thus, the Public Service Commission 
was well within its jurisdiction to interpret the tariff at 
issue in this case. 
B. The standard of review of a Public Service Commis-
sion order interpreting a tariff is to uphold the 
order if it is reasonable or rational. 
In Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public 
Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983) [Wexpro II], 
this Court established a three part formula for review of 
administrative agency decisions: 
1. With regard to interpretation of general questions 
of law, this Court applies a correction-of-error standard, 
giving no deference to the expertise of the Commission. Id. 
at 608. 
2. With regard to findings of basic fact, the Court 
gives the greatest deference to the agency's findings, re-
versing only where they are so without foundation in fact 
that they must be deemed capricious and arbitrary. I<i. a t 
608-09. 
3. With respect to mixed questions of law and fact, or 
the application of findings of basic facts to the legal 
rules governing the case, or the "ultimate" findings of the 
agency on reasonableness and discrimination, or the agency's 
decision on questions of "special law", this Court gives 
"considerable weight" or "great deference" to the agency's 
decision, upholding such decisions if they fall within the 
limits of reasonableness or rationality. Id. at 609-12. 
See Utah Code Ann, § 54-7-16. See also, Big K Corp. v. 
Public Service Commission, 689 P.2d 1349 (Utah 1984). 
This third standard of review applies here because this 
case involves the application of a tariff, which is the law 
governing the relation between a utility and its customers, 
see Atkin, Wright & Miles v. Mountain Bell, 709 P.2d 330 
(Utah 1985), to specific facts. The Commission determined 
that under the tariff Mountain Bell may transfer a partner-
ship debt for telephone service to the individual account of 
one of the general partners. Under the intermediate stan-
dard of review applicable here, this Court should give great 
deference to that decision, and should affirm it if it falls 
within the "outer limits of reasonableness". See Wexpro II, 
supra, at 611. 
C. The Public Service Commission's order is reasonable 
and should therefore be upheld. 
The Public Service Commission's determination that the 
tariff permitted cross-billing of a partnership account to 
the individual account of a general partner is reasonable, 
both from a legal perspective and on a practical basis. 
Utah statutory law provides unequivocally that a general 
partner is personally liable for the debts of the 
partnership: 
All partners are liable: 
• • • 
(2) Jointly for all other [non-tort/non-breach of 
trust] debts and obligations of the partner-
ship . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 48-1-12. 
That a partner's liability for contractual debts is 
joint, rather than joint and several (as in subparagraph 1 
of the same section), is simply a procedural restriction on 
a creditor who seeks to enforce a debt through judicial 
means. That is, all partners are necessary parties to a 
lawsuit to enforce such a debt against any one of them. See 
Palle v. Industrial Commission, 79 Utah 47, 7 P.2d 284, 287-
88 (1932); cf. Kemp v. Murray, 680 P.2d 758 (Utah 1984) (all 
partners are necessary parties to an action to collect a 
debt to the partnership). The fact remains, however, that 
each partner is personally indebted for partnership obliga-
tions. See definition of "liability" in Black's Law Dictio-
nary 1059 (4th Rev.Ed. 1968). Therefore, notwithstanding 
the fact that Mountain Bell would have to join James McCune 
in any judicial action to recover the debt from George 
McCune, George McCune is still indebted to Mountain Bell for 
$317.29, representing the McCune & McCune debt for telephone 
service. 
Under the tariff language (see supra p.7), the only 
prerequisites to cross-billing are (1) that George McCune 
was a customer of Mountain Bell and (2) that he was indebted 
to Mountain Bell for charges and services previously ren-
dered in Utah. At the time of the transfer, he was clearly 
a customer of Mountain Bell, with current working business 
servicef and he was indebted to Mountain Bell for charges 
and services previously rendered. Note that the tariff lan-
guage does not say "charges and services rendered to that 
customer under his or her own namew, or similar language. 
It simply requires a customer to be indebted to Mountain 
Bell for prior charges and services. 
The tariff does not require Mountain Bell to obtain a 
judicial declaration of indebtedness, as by obtaining a 
judgment against a partner on a partnership account. 
McCune's insistence that Mountain Bell must first obtain a 
judgment against the partnership and exhaust its assets be-
fore proceeding against a partner is misplaced. This is not 
a case of judicial collection of a debt nor of an extra-
judicial attempt to execute on McCune's personal assets; it 
is a case of application of an administrative rule permit-
ting a public utility to deny continuing service to a cus-
tomer who fails to satisfy a past due obligation. 
The Commission's interpretation of the tariff also makes 
practical sense. Cross-billing encourages payment by a 
responsible party. Payment of such indebtedness contributes 
to the utility's earnings, thus reducing the need for rate 
increases. Cross-billing places the burden for such debts 
where it belongs, rather than on other ratepayers. From a 
cost-effectiveness standpoint, to the extent cross-billing 
results in payment, it is a much more efficient means of 
collection than any other alternative, such as collection 
agencies, attorneys, or even internal collection efforts. 
The policy which denies service to a customer who fails to 
pay past indebtedness is eminently fair; it does not impose 
any new obligation on the customer, nor does it permit 
Mountain Bell to recover more than what is owed. It simply 
benefits the public by reducing collection costs, and cuts 
off credit to those who abuse credit by not paying for prior 
service. 
As applied to this case, not only is the tariff just and 
reasonable, but Mountain Bell would be derelict not to use 
it. The partnership was dissolved more than a year before 
the transfer took place (R. 197, 198). The account is un-
disputed and relatively small (R. 91). McCune has refused 
to give any explanation why the partnership account has not 
been paid, or whether it will ever be paid, or if so, when 
(R. 88). Mountain Bell stands the risk of losing the ac-
count altogether by virtue of the running of the statute of 
limitations. The cost of recovering it through judicial 
means makes that alternative unattractive and detrimental to 
other ratepayers. Under these circumstances, it is rea-
sonable to expect a partner such as George McCune to 
shoulder the responsibility for paying the partnership debtf 
at the risk of not having further telephone service if he 
fails to do so. 
Under the standard of review applicable to this case, 
this Court should affirm the Public Service Commission Or-
der , because it falls well within the bounds of 
reasonableness. 
D. The Public Service Commission did not act with 
bias, prejudice or passion? 
McCune's allegations of improper treatment received at 
the hands of the Public Service Commission cannot be sup-
ported by the record. McCune1s Brief refers to testimony 
given at the hearing. (Brief of Appellant p. 11). However, 
McCune opted not to order a copy of the transcript of the 
hearing, and is therefore forced to rely on the Report and 
Order. 
In the absence of a transcript, this Court must assume 
that the proceedings were conducted fairly. Bevan v. J. H. 
Construction Co., Inc.f 669 P.2d 442 (Utah 1983). There can 
be no doubt that McCune was given ample oppurtunity to pres-
ent his case. That he received an adverse ruling is not 
grounds for a claim of prejudice sufficient to reverse the 
Commission's Order. Reversal for bias must be based on 
evidence of a judge's personal hostility toward a party, not 
on the tribunal's opinion as to the merits of the case, Has-
lam v. Morrison, 113 Utah 14, 190 P.2d 520 (1948); there is 
no evidence in the record that any feelings expressed by the 
Administrative Law Judge or the Commission were based on 
anything other than the evidence and material facts of this 
case. 
E. The Public Service Commission properly determined 
that issues regarding the disconnection of James 
McCune's residence service were moot. 
McCune complains that the Commission failed to address 
the disconnection of the residence service of James McCune, 
holding it to be a moot question. To do so, however, would 
require the Commission to render an advisory opinion where 
it does not have power to grant appropriate relief (money 
damages in this case). Furthermore, McCune would have an 
available remedy on that claim in the district court, which 
is the appropriate forum to pursue a tort action for wrong-
ful disconnection. See Atkin, Wright & Miles v. The 
Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company, 709 P.2d 
330 (Utah 1985); Josephson v. Mountain Bell, 576 P.2d 850 
(Utah 1978). 
The Public Service Commission does not have the power to 
award general damages, cf. Garkane Power Association v. 
Public Service Commission, 681 P.2d 1196, 1207 (Utah 1984) 
(an order for reparation under Utah Code Ann. § 54-7-20 is 
not the equivalent of a contract action for damages in a 
district court); the only relief it could grant for a wrong-
ful disconnection would be to order the utility to restore 
service and waive the restoral charges. See, e.g. Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 54-7-20, 54-7-24. That had already taken place be-
fore the Complaint was filed. Thus, the Public Service 
Commission correctly determined that the complaint was moot 
as to James and Arlene McCune. 
II. MOUNTAIN BELL DID NOT VIOLATE ANY CONSTITUTIONAL, 
STATUTORY OR COMMON LAW RIGHTS OF MCCUNE BY TRANSFERRING 
THE PARTNERSHIP DEBT TO HIS PROPRIETORSHIP ACCOUNT. 
A. There was no violation of constitutional rights. 
McCunes assert that they have been denied due process 
because of the disconnection or threat of disconnection of 
telephone service without notice and a hearing. There is a 
substantial question whether one would be deprived of life, 
liberty or property by virtue of disconnection of telephone 
service. See Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 
345, 348 n.2 (1974). More importantly, however, McCunes are 
not entitled to constitutional due process in this situation 
because a public utility's actions in disconnecting service 
do not constitute state action. In Jackson v. Metropolitan 
Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974), the United States 
Supreme Court stated: 
"The mere fact that a business is subject to state reg-
ulation does not by itself convert its action into that 
of the State for purposes of the 14th Amendment." 
The effect of the decision was to uphold the right of the 
defendant, a public utility, to disconnect service to the 
plaintiff for failure to pay a prior bill, without notice or 
hearing, Jackson is dispositive of McCune's constitutional 
challenges in this case. Furthermore, McCune's equal pro-
tection argument fails for lack of any evidence that 
Mountain Bell treated him differently than others similarly 
situated. See Malan v. Lewis, 693 P.2d 661, 671 (Utah 
1984). 
B. There was no violation of statutory law. 
The statutory standard for validity of tariff provisions 
is set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 54-3-1: 
... All rules and regulations made by a public utility 
affecting or pertaining to its charges or service to the 
public shall be just and reasonable. (Emphasis added). 
That section further provides: 
The scope of the definition "just and reasonable" may 
include, but shall not be limited to, the cost of pro-
viding service to each category of customer, economic 
impact of charges on each category of customer, and on 
the well-being of the State of Utah. . . . 
The tariff permitting the transfer of indebtedness to 
current accounts is just and reasonable, both on its face 
and as applied to the facts of this case. See discussion, 
supra, pp. 10-15. 
C. There was no violation of common law. 
Cross-billing and disconnection have been upheld judi-
cially where authorized by tariff. In Morse v. Pacific Gas 
& Electric, 152 Cal.App.2d 854, 314 P.2d 192 (1957), the 
Court approved the disconnection of electrical service to a 
subscriber at one residence when he had failed to pay for 
service at another residence, under a tariff provision simi-
lar to the one at issue here. See also, Dworman v. Consoli-
dated Edison Co. of New York, Inc., 271 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1966) 
(allowing cross-billing from business to residence); Denham 
v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 415 F.Supp. 530, 534 
(W.D. Okla. 1976). Cf., Northern Ohio Telephone Co. v. 
Public Utilities Commission, 9 Ohio St. 2d 153, 224 N.E.2d 
528 (1967) (denying the utility's right to disconnect at 
locations other than where the default took place because 
the applicable tariff did not allow cross-billing). 
Josephson v. Mountain Bell, 576 P.2d 850 (Utah 1978), 
does not preclude Mountain Bell from cross-billing from one 
business to another business. In Josephson, the Court held 
that Mountain Bell was not entitled to disconnect the 
plaintiff's residence service for failure to pay the charges 
for plaintiff's business service, because, inter alia, 
Mountain Bell had failed to follow the procedure set forth 
in the tariff of billing the charges to the residence ser-
vice account before disconnecting. j[d. at 852. Though pres-
ented with the opportunity, this Court did not hold the 
tariff to be unjust or unreasonable. Furthermore, even if 
Josephson were read to mean that Mountain Bell could never 
disconnect a residence phone for non-payment of business 
service, the rationale used by the Court would not apply to 
this case, since the partnership service and George McCune's 
proprietorship service were both of a business class. The 
Commission reached the same conclusion (R. 277). 
If Josephson were held applicable here, Mountain Bell 
submits that it was wronqly decided and should be overruled. 
It has been held that a public utility has a right to deny 
service at one address for failure to pay for past service 
at another address, where the right is founded on a filed 
tariff. See generally, Annot. 73 A.L.R.3d 1292 §§ 4[c], 
4[e] (1976). Justice Hall's dissent in Josephson noted that 
it would be inefficient and detrimental to other rate payers 
to prohibit crossbilling for the purpose of debt collection, 
observing that no one should be entitled to profit from his 
own wrongdoing. The dissent in Josephson is better reasoned 
than the majority opinion, and should be adopted by this 
Court as the law of Utah. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Mountain Bell's tariff specifically permits the rebill-
ing of a customer's indebtedness for prior charges and ser-
vices to the customer's current service. George McCune, as 
a general partner of McCune & McCune, is personally indebted 
to Mountain Bell for service to the partnership. The tariff 
is reasonable, just, and in the public interest. McCune 
ought to be required to pay the indebtedness if he wishes to 
receive further service. The Commission's interpretation of 
the tariff is reasonable and proper, and should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2nd day of Julyf 1986, 
THE MOUNTAIN STATES TELEPHONE 
AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
Floyd^A. Jensen 
250 Bell Plaza, 





I hereby certify that on this 2nd day of July, 1986f I 
caused to be mailed four (4) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing Brief of Respondent, by first-class mail, postage 
prepaid, to plaintifffs attorney, George M. McCune at Suite 
2, Intrade North West, 1399 South 700 East, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84105 and four (4) true and correct copies to the 
Public Service Commission of Utah, 160 East 300 South, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84145. 
c ^ * ^ 
ADDENDUM 1 
Public Service Commission 
Report and Order 
Dated November 15, 1985 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH 
'
C£k-
MCCUNE & MCCUNE, a General 
Partnership; GEORGE M. MCCUNE, 
an Individual; JAMES P. MCCUNE, 
an individual; and ARLENE C. 
MCCUNE, an Individual, 
Complainants 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN BELL TELEPHONE, an 
Assumed Name of MOUNTAIN STATES 
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 
a Public Service Telephone 
Corporation, Respondent. 
CASE NO. 85-049-03 
REPORT AND ORDER 
Complainants 
Respondent 
ISSUED: November 15, 1985 
Appearances: 
George M. McCune For 
Floyd A. Jensen w 
By the Commission: 
Pursuant to notice duly served, this matter came on 
regularly for hearing the 11th day of October, 1985, before A. 
Robert Thurman, Administrative Law Judge for the Commission, at 
the Commission Offices, Fourth Floor, Heber M. Wells State Office 
Building, 160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah. Evidence was 
offered and received, and the Administrative Law Judge, having 
been fully advised in the premises, now enters the following 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and the Order based there-
on. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1 , McCune & McCune was a general law partnership doing 
business in the state of Utah from November 1973 through November 
1983, at which time it was dissolved. The sole partners were 
George M. and James P. McCune. At this juncture, as discussed 
below, the complaints of all parties except George M. McCune are 
moot, so far as this Commission is concerned, and hence we will 
refer to George M. McCune as "Complainant". 
2, Mountain Bell Telephone, hereafter called "Respon-
dent" , is a utility holding a certificate of convenience and 
necessity from this Commission operating a telephone system. 
3* Respondent provided telephone service to McCune and 
McCune in Provo, Utah, under telephone number 373-0307, which 
service was discontinued when the partnership dissolved, leaving 
an unpaid balance of $317.29, the amount in dispute in this 
proceeding. The balance remained unpaid at the time of the 
hearing. 
4, Approximately June, 1984, Respondent transferred 
the partnership balance to the residence account of James P. 
McCune. Shortly thereafter, in July or August (the date is not 
critical), Respondent disconnected James P. McCune's residential 
service for failure to pay the partnership balance,. On or about 
September 6, 1984, Respondent rescinded its action and restored 
James P. McCune's residential service. 
5* On or about January 16, 1985, Respondent trans-
ferred the partnership's outstanding balance to the working 
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business account (listed as a sole proprietorship) of 
Complainant. In March, 1985, this balance was billed to the 
proprietorship account. 
6. Complainant refused to pay the transferred balance 
and this complaint proceeding ensued. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Section 54-7-20, Utah Code Ann. 1953, provides that: 
(1) When complaint has been made to the 
commission concerning any rate, fare, toll, 
rental or charge for any product or commodity 
furnished or service performed by any public 
utility, and the commission has found, after 
investigation, that the public utility has 
charged an amount for such product, commodity 
or service in excess of the schedules, rates 
and tariffs on file with the commission, or 
has charged an unjust, unreasonable or 
discriminatory amount against the complain-
ant, the commission may order that the public 
utility make due reparation to the complain-
ant therefor, with interest from the date of 
collection. 
Although the statute mentions only authority to grant relief by 
way of reparations in cases of this nature, we think it reason-
able to assume that we could order a utility to continue service 
to a customer invalidly charged under an illegal tariff pro-
vision. 
At the time Respondent first transferred the partner-
ship balance to James P. McCune, the applicable tariff provision 
read as follows: 
In the event a customer is indebted to the 
Company for charges and services previously 
rendered in Utah, or for services under one 
or more numbers at the same location, and the 
customer does not pay the charges or satisfy 
such indebtedness, the Company may charge and 
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bill such indebtedness for a residence 
account against the same customer's residence 
service or a business account against the 
customer's business service, (Mountain 
States Telephone and Telegraph - Utah General 
Exchange Tariff A2.2.3.2(3)) 
It was in literal compliance with this provision that 
the transfer to James P. McCune's residence account was rescind-
ed. As a further consequence, however, Respondent amended its 
tariff to read as follows: 
In the event a customer is indebted to the 
Company for charges and services rendered at 
a prior time, of any nature, or for service 
at more than one number or location, and the 
customer does not pay the charges or satisfy 
such indebtedness, the Company may charge and 
bill such indebtedness against the account of 
the customer's present service or to the 
account of either service in the case where 
more than one number or location is being 
served. (Mountain States Telephone and 
Telegraph - Utah General Exchange Tariff 
A2.2.3.2(3), amended March 4, 1985) 
It will be noted that either tariff provision would 
apply in regard to Complainant's situation. Accordingly, we are 
not faced with a question of interpreting the tariff. Since 
service has been restored to James P. and Arlene C. McCune, and 
the tariff provision relied upon at that time has been supersed-
ed, we conclude the complaints of these individuals is wholly 
moot. Accordingly, we deal only with the propriety of the 
transfer of the partnership balance to the sole proprietor 
account of Complainant. 
Complainant stated his argument in several ways, but 
the kernel of the argument is that the Respondent's tariff, 
either version, is invalid as it applies to him, because it 
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denies him his right to have the partnership assets marshalled 
and exhausted before a partnership creditor may reach his person-
al assets. According to the Complainant, Respondents only 
remedy in cases of this nature is to obtain a judgment against 
the partnership, attempt to execute on partnership property, and 
only upon a showing of exhaustion of the same is Respondent 
entitled to attempt collection from Complainant. 
By analogy, were we to accept Complainant's position, 
had the partnership ordered merchandise from an office supplier 
and failed to payf the supplier would not be justified in denying 
Complainant credit for failure to pay the outstanding balance. 
Such is obviously not the law. While Complainant may have the 
right to have the assets marshalled in judicial proceedings, he 
is at least secondarily liable on the partnership deht, and we 
know of no authority which would deny a partnership creditor the 
right to use such leverage as he may have by way of the right to 
enter into or avoid further transactions with a partner as a 
means of encouraging payment. Nor does this appear to us unduly 
harsh. The partner has the right of contribution from his 
copartners. 
Does Respondent's status as a public utility alter the 
situation? Complainant argues it does and relies on the case of 
John C. Josephson v. Mountain Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co., 
576 P.2d 850, 24 PUR 4th 65 (Utah 1978). That case involved the 
transfer of a business account balance to a residence account. 
The applicable tariff at the time was virtually identical to the 
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March 4, 1985, amended version quoted above. The Court's opinion 
is somewhat ambiguous, but the Court did not in so many words 
rule the tariff invalid and appears to have reasoned that Respon-
dent did not fully comply with its own tariff in that it failed 
to bill the delinquent account on the debtor1s residence service 
before terminating the same. There is additional language 
concerning the interests of other members of the household in 
maintaining telephone service, but that interest is hardly 
present in the instant case. Moreover, Respondent did bill 
Complainant. Accordingly, we do not believe the Josephson case 
is apposite here. 
Complainant argues that Respondent could pursue its 
judicial remedy at minimal expense in small claims court, and we 
should compel it to do so. This argument from a member of the 
bar well acquainted with the means to force delays and increase 
costs strikes us as less than ingenuous. If we are compar-
ing equities, Complainant has nothing to lose but his time in a 
claim against his partner in small claims court. Respondent 
would clearly have out-of-pocket expense. The fact of the matter 
is that bad debt expenses are included as operating expense in 
every rate case. This means that all ratepayers bear the costs 
caused by those who abuse the system. We see no reason why, in 
circumstances such as this, those ratepayers should not be 
accorded the benefit of Respondent's leverage in the form of the 
power to provide or withhold service. The balance has gone 
unpaid over two years. That strikes us as more than long enough. 
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Finally, Complainant would have us invalidate the 
tariff as overly broad on the basis of the Josephson case. As 
noted above, the Utah Supreme Court did not do so, and we are not 
faced in this case with a fact situation as appealing as 
Josephson. Accordingly, we decline to invalidate the tariff 
provision at this point. The complaint should be dismissed. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the com-
plaint in the above-captioned matter be, and the same hereby is, 
dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 15th day of 
November, 1985. 
A. Robert Thurman 
Administrative Law Judge 
Approved and confirmed this 15th day of November, 1985, 
as the Report and Order of the Commission with the following 
comments: 
COMMISSION COMMENTS 
We concur in this Order, however, we frankly find this 
case infuriating. For a member or members of the Utah State Bar 
to use, or we might say, abuse the "system" over an uncontested 
$317.29 two-year old debt, is absurd. 
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The expense to the regulated utility (billing, col-
lection, legal, etc.) and the expense to the state regulatory 
agency (Administrative Law Judge, court reporter, clerical, 
Commission review, etc.), which is ultimately born by the rate-
paying citizens of this state, could well exceed $5,000 T* 
Chief Justice Burger has recently chastised the legal 
profession for being too litigious. No matter how valid the 
complainant's feel their cause is, as a strictly legal matter, we 
believe that it is unconscionable for members of the Bar to abuse 
the system to this extent and would, were it possible, impose the 
full cost upon complainants. 
UsuUl 
Brent H. Cahieron, Chairman 




Public Service Commission 
Order Denying 
Application for Rehearing 
Dated December 20, 1985 
- BEFORE THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH -
MCCUNE & MCCUNE, a General 
Partnership; GEORGE M. MCCUNE, 
an Individual; JAMES P. MCCUNE, 
an Individual; and ARLENE C. 
MCCUNE, an Individual, 
Complainants 
vs. 
MOUNTAIN BELL TELEPHONE, an 
Assumed Name of MOUNTAIN STATES 
TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY, 
a Public Service Telephone 
Corporation, Respondent. 
ISSUED: December 20, 1985 
By the Commission: 
On November 15, 1985, the Commission issued its Report 
and Order dismissing Complainants1 Complaint for want of merit 
and Complainants thereafter filed an Application for Review or 
Rehearing with the Commission on December 2, 1985. 
After review of the Complainants' Application for 
Review or Rehearing, we conclude that it sheds no additional 
illumination on the case and that it constitutes primarily a 
diatribe against the Commission and its Administrative Law 
Judges. Accordingly, we shall dismiss it. 
ORDER 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, That the Applica-
tion for Review or Rehearing filed by Complainants in this matter 
be and the same is dismissed. 
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DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 20th day of Decem-
b e r , 1985. 
£ . ^ 
artjzTs M. Byrne, Commissioner 
, Commissioner 
Georgia 
Executi 
Peterson 
Secretary 
mm 
